Decision Theory and Rationality offers a challenging new interpretation of a key theoretical tool in the human and social sciences. This accessible book argues, contrary to orthodoxy in politics, economics, and management science, that decision theory cannot provide a theory of rationality.

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. The goal of this book is to assess the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and its conclusions challenge this consensus. The book articulates and defends a theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition, and argues that although the theory has the (...) resources for blocking the main standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which the theory offers no defence, as it doesn’t rely on any assumptions that the theory would render illegitimate. The book ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution—that although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition. (shrink)

The author challenges the view that birth cannot be a morally relevant fact in the process of development from zygote to child. He reviews specific arguments against giving any moral significance to the fact of birth. Drawing on recent work in developmental psychology, he contends that the lives of neonates can have a level of self-consciousness that confers moral significance but can only be possessed after birth. He shows that the position he has argued for provides a framework within which (...) the move from the moral validity of aborting sentient fetuses to the moral validity of infanticide might be resisted. He concludes that arguments suggesting that birth can be morally significant support the view that the acquisition of moral significance is a gradual and multilayered phenomenon. (shrink)

The paper deals with a version of the principle that a belief source can be a knowledge source only if the subject knows that it is reliable. I argue that the principle can be saved from the main objections that motivate its widespread rejection: the claim that it leads to skepticism, the claim that it forces us to accept counterintuitive knowledge ascriptions and the claim that it is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I argue that naturalist epistemologists should reject (...) these claims. I introduce my treatment of the principle by considering the analogous situation posed by the closure principle. (shrink)

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing (...) free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation. (shrink)

Dedekind’s methodology, in his classic booklet on the foundations of arithmetic, has been the topic of some debate. While some authors make it closely analogue to Hilbert’s early axiomatics, others emphasize its idiosyncratic features, most importantly the fact that no axioms are stated and its careful deductive structure apparently rests on definitions alone. In particular, the so-called Dedekind “axioms” of arithmetic are presented by him as “characteristic conditions” in the _definition_ of the complex concept of a _simply infinite_ system. Making (...) sense of Dedekind’s method may be dependent on an analysis of the classical model of deductive science, as presented by authors from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Studying the modern reconstructions of Euclidean geometry, we show that they did not presuppose deductive independence of the axioms from the definitions. Authors like Wolff elaborated a mathematics _based on definitions_, and the Wolffian model of deductive science shows significant coincidences with Dedekind’s method, despite the great differences in content and approach. Wolff had a conception of definitions as _genetic_, which bears some similarities with Kant’s idea of synthetic definitions: they are understood as positing the content of mathematical concepts and introducing thought objects (_Gedankendinge_) that are the objects of mathematics. The emphasis on the spontaneity of the understanding, which can be found in this philosophical tradition, can also be fruitfully related with Dedekind’s idea of the “free creation” of mathematical objects. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to identify the elements that can be implemented to achieve an ethical infrastructure, in small and medium enterprises. The ethical infrastructure is considered as a set of formal and informal systems, leadership, climate and culture, related to ethical issues. The research was carried out through interviews and focus groups with managers from 28 companies in Madrid, all signatories to the Global Compact. The identified key elements in SMEs are leadership, informal managerial and formal communication. (...) This study also explores different factors that influence the effectiveness, implementation, and sustainability of the ethical infrastructure in SMEs, discovering some factors that can act as both accelerators and barriers such as pressure from customers. Additional findings regarding the concepts of ethics and corporate social responsibility in SMEs, dilemmas and characteristics of the culture and climate are also presented. (shrink)

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305–328, 2010 ) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along (...) several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs! (shrink)

Despite the importance of network analysis in biological practice, dominant models of scientific explanation do not account satisfactorily for how this family of explanations gain their explanatory power in every specific application. This insufficiency is particularly salient in the study of the ecology of the microbiome. Drawing on Coyte et al. (2015) study of the ecology of the microbiome, Deulofeu et al. (2021) argue that these explanations are neither mechanistic, nor purely mathematical, yet they are substantially empirical. Building on their (...) criticisms, in the present work we make a step further elucidating this kind of explanations with a general analytical framework according to which scientific explanations are ampliative, specialized embeddings (ASE), which has recently been successfully applied to other biological subfields. We use ASE to reconstruct in detail the Coyte et al.’s case study and on its basis, we claim that network explanations of the ecology of the microbiome, and other similar explanations in ecology, gain their epistemological force in virtue of their capacity to embed biological phenomena in non-accidental generalizations that are simultaneously ampliative and specialized. (shrink)

Re-activating the philosophical quest for real definitions, I dare propose that its fulfillment is most convincingly represented, close to home, where one probably least expects it, notably in the first half of Section 36 of Word and Object, in the pages of Quine. Aristotle must inevitably remain our guide even as we insist on respecting Quine's anti-essentialism, and I must then explain how Aristotle, truncated, can be put here to use. Well, we may begin, appropriately, with a definition or with (...) what, nearly enough, smacks of being one, namely the Aristotelian slogan, definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam. Although that may be itself a real definition (of real definition), I shall not pursue this scholastic point, preferring to concentrate on my principal task which I take to be to vindicate the feasibility of formulating a real definition of some mind-independent reality. Such a vindication can scarcely succeed today unless it is recognized from the outset that we have here at hand one of those cases where the very (logical) possibility of a problematic thing can be established only by having recourse to the modal principle that actuality entails possibility. Nothing less than a concrete instance of a real definition will then suffice, and I thus expect my sceptical reader (I count on her scepticism) to be in doubt whether the scholastic bit of jargon 'real definition' picks out one of the concepts in her repertoire. (shrink)

I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.

This volume comprises nine lively and insightful essays by leading scholars on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work.

A virtue approach to argumentation would focus on the arguers’ character rather than the arguments. Therefore, it must be explained how good arguments relate to virtuous arguers. This article focus on this issue and attempts to provide an answer to the question: Could a bad arguer produce a good argument? It is argued that, besides the usual logical, dialectical, and rhetorical standards, a virtuously produced good argument must meet two additional requirements: the arguer must be in a specific state of (...) mind, and the argument must be broadly conceived of as an argumentative interaction and thus excel from every perspective. (shrink)

Many controversies within philosophy of science have been attempted to be explained in terms of the metaphilosophical prescription/description distinction over the goal of philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to show that the controversy between Popper and Kuhn about the ir/rationality of Normal Science cannot be fully explained in these terms, not even if we also take the truth/problem-solving distinction over the goal of science into account. It is argued that, to gain full understanding of this controversy, (...) it is necessary to take into account their differences regarding a topic apparently not involved in it, namely the structure of scientific theories. The conclusion is that both Popper and Kuhn were descriptive/prescriptive at the same time in their attempt to make the rules of scientific practice explicit, yet Kuhn did it better because he had a richer and more accurate idea of what scientific theories are. Although this work is mainly a piece of history of philosophy of science, it also aims at shedding some light on epistemological issues. If the conclusion is sound, it also shows how structural aspects of scientific theories may be relevant to the epistemology of science.Keywords: Falsificationism; Normal science; Rationality; Theories; Thomas Kuhn; Karl Popper. (shrink)

I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to generate a (...) version of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles. (shrink)

I use some ideas of Keith DeRose's to develop an (invariantist!) account of why sceptical reasoning doesn't show that I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat. I argue that knowledge is subject to the risk-of-error constraint: a true belief won’t have the status of knowledge if there is a substantial risk of the belief being in error that hasn’t been brought under control. When a substantial risk of error is present (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are (...) false in nearby worlds), satisfying the constraint requires bringing the risk under control. This is achieved either by sensitivity, i.e. you wouldn’t have the belief if it were false, or by identifying evidence for the proposition. However, when the risk of error is not substantial (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are not false in nearby worlds), the constraint is satisfied by default. My belief that I am not a brain in a vat is insensitive and I have no evidence for it, but since it is not false in nearby worlds, it satisfies the constraint by default. (shrink)

The architecture of brain, consciousness, and behavioral processes is shown to be formally similar in that all three may be conceived and depicted as Petri net patterned processes structured by a series of elements occurring or becoming active in stochastic succession, in parallel, with different rhythms of temporal iteration, and with a distinct qualitative manifestation in the spatiotemporal domain. A patterned process theory is derived from the isomorphic features of the models and contrasted with connectionist, dynamic system notions. This empirically (...) derived formulation is considered to be optimally compatible with the dual aspect theory in that the foundation of the diverse aspects would be a highly structured and dynamic process, the psychophysical neutral “ground” of mind and matter posed (but not properly determined) by dual aspect and neutral monist theories. It is methodologically sound to approach each one of these processes with specific tools and to establish concurrences in real time between them at the organismic level of analysis. Such intra‐level and inter‐perspective correlations could eventually constitute psychophysical bridge‐laws. A mature psychology of consciousness is necessary to situate and verify the bridges required by a genuine mind‐body science. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to identify what I take to be the main conceptual problem in Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals when the Limit Assumption is not satisfied, what I call the Discrimination Problem , and to present and discuss a modification of Lewis’ semantics that aims at solving DP. First, I outline Lewis’ semantics, highlighting the aspects that will be relevant for our discussion. Second, I present DP and discuss it with a heuristic example. Third, I present the (...) new proposal and comment some formal consequences and the objections they give rise to. Fourth, I present an allegedly equivalent version of the proposal and discuss the difference between counterfactuals and strict conditionals. Finally, I defend that the two proposals are different and argue for the first one as the best way of capturing two intuitions that seem in conflict when the LA is not satisfied. I conclude with a dilemma: either the proposal here defended works or LA is inescapable. Thus, if the proposal doe.. (shrink)

The paper deals with our ability to classify objects as being of a certain kind on the basis of information provided by the senses (empirical classification) and to ascribe empirical predicates to objects on the basis of these classificatory verdicts (empirical predication). I consider, first, the project of construing the episodes in which this ability is exercised as involving universals. I argue that this construal faces epistemological problems concerning our access to the universals that it invokes. I present the empiricist (...) strategy for dealing with these problems by appeal to sensory qualities, and argue that it rests on a mistake. Then I turn to sketching an account of our faculty of empirical classification and predication which doesn't invoke universals. The account takes as its starting point the nominalist construal of sense experience to be found in the work of C. I. Lewis and Nelson Goodman. I argue that this construal has the resources for explaining some of the central features of the practice of empirical predication. There are those who feel that our ability to understand general terms ... would be inexplicable unless there were universals as objects of apprehension. And there are those who fail to detect, in such appeal to a realm of entities over and above the concrete objects in space and time, any explanatory value. W. V. O. Quine, ‘Logic and the Reification of Universals’. (shrink)

O artigo se apóia na filosofia da história da Walter Benjamin para denunciar a barbárie que se aloja na base da sociedade ocidental e promove a exclusão e o esquecimento das vítimas. Indica o papel político da memória na construção da democracia e no resgate da dignidade humana, reconhecida a partir da alteridade evidenciada no sofrimento, seguindo mais de perto a experiência das ditaduras latinoamericanas, em especial, a da ditadura militar brasileira. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Justiça das vítimas. Memória política. História e (...) narração. Dignidade da pessoa humana. Ditadura Militar. Walter Benjamin. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 On February 12, 1440 Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) concludes in his birthplace of Kues drafting the first major systematic formulation of his thinking: De docta ignorantia . The main category of his metaphysics in this context, i.e. the maximum , is analyzed and interpreted by him on three considerations: the maximum in an absolute sense, as contracted and finally as absolute and contracted, at the same time. In the context of the First Book, (...) which presents the singular methodology of the docta ignorantia , considers the maximum in itself in light of the paradoxical concept of coincidentia oppositorum in the absolute. In the final chapters of this first book tackles the critical of the theological discourse and thus, the problem of the ineffable name of maximum et minimum absolutum . Hence the purpose of this work is the further on cusan’s evaluation of language problem as it shows through treatment of the theological discourses and divine names that emerge from them, in light of the way of docta ignorantia. (shrink)

The no-miracles argument is the main inference-to-the-best-explanation kind of argument for scientific realism, and the pessimistic induction is considered a main, if not the main, challenge for a NMA-based scientific realism. Doppelt advocates a new kind of inference-to-the-best-explanation supported scientific realism that he labels Best Theory Realism. If successful in replacing standard selective realism as the best version of scientific realism, BTR would be particularly good since it is not committed to the partial truth of past theories and thereby it (...) is immune to the antirealist strategy of finding cases of past, predictively successful theories with predictively essential components not retained by later theories. The goal of this paper is to raise doubts about Doppelt’s attempt and argue that, other benefits of his proposal notwithstanding, it fails. In section 1 I summarize the main tenets of standard, retentive selective realism relevant for the present discussion. In section 2 I show that Doppelt’s main arguments against retentive selective realism do not work. In section 3, I argue that the way BTR faces the challenge posed by the historical record that motivates PI is unsatisfactory and puts Doppelt into a fatal trilemma: either he is committed to two claims that are untenable together; or endorses an extremely implausible form of present-science chauvinism; or unjustifiably discriminates explanation against prediction in historical record. The conclusion is that BTR falls short of substituting standard retentive selective realism as the most plausible realist position, and that thereby the cases of past successful theories with predictively essential parts not retained by posterior theories are still a real problem for a plausible realist position. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

It has been often claimed that physicalism challenges the explanatory autonomy of psychological sciences. Most who advocate for such explanatory autonomy and do not want to renounce to physicalism, presuppose a causalist account of explanatoriness and try to demonstrate that, adequately construed, (causal) psychological explanations are compatible with (some sufficient version of) physicalism. In Sect. 1 we summarize the different theses and assumptions involved in the seeming conflict between explanatory autonomy and physicalism. In Sect. 2 we review the main attempts (...) to make them compatible assuming a causalist account of explanation and argue that none succeeds. In Sect. 3 we introduce a recent, non-causalist account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding (ASE) that has been successfully applied to other fields. In Sect. 4 we apply ASE to elucidate two paradigmatic cognitive explanations of psychological phenomena: déjà vu and action production. We conclude that ASE elucidates well the autonomy of the cognitive explanations of these phenomena independently of what finally happens with the causal exclusion problem and that it may be generalized to other psychological explanations. (shrink)

This book clarifies the meaning of the most important and pervasive concepts and tools in bioethical argumentation and assesses the methodological suitability of the main methods for clinical decision-making and argumentation. The first part of the book is devoted to the most developed or promising approaches regarding bioethical argumentation, namely those based on principles, values and human rights. The authors then continue to deal with the contributions and shortcomings of these approaches and suggest further developments by means of substantive and (...) procedural elements and concepts from practical philosophy, normative systems theory, theory of action, human rights and legal argumentation. Furthermore, new models of biomedical and health care decision-making, which overcome the aforementioned criticism and stress the relevance of the argumentative responsibility, are included. (shrink)

Weber's piece on the development of the north-European Western city has not commanded attention in the recent theoretical literature. This article argues that it can however provide fresh insights into some key problems of Weber's diagnosis of modernity and into his general sociological theory, especially as to his theory of action and creativity. A more open-ended conception of modernity can be gained from its analysis, which is more compatible with Weber's own methodological assumptions. A different relationship between freedom and rationality (...) may be derived as a theoretical and political consequence from the discussion of The City. Key Words: collective subjectivity • creativity • freedom • modernity • rationalization • Weber • Western city. (shrink)

The radical posthumanism of Kurzweil aims to achieve immortality. Fukuyama and Habermas criticize posthumanism defending the idea of an inalterable human nature. Pinker, for his part, considers that there is a human nature, but susceptible to modifications. There is a limit to human nature: it is found in the mortal nature of each member of the human species. Sloterdijk will introduce a nuance and insist on the natality of the creative acts of man, standing in continuity with the Nietzschean concept (...) of overman. (shrink)

Books Reviewed in this Article: Introduction to the Critical Study of the Text of the Hebrew Bible. By J. Weingreen. Pp.vii, 103, Oxford, Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1982, £5.50. The Archaeology of the Land of Israel. By Yohanan Aharoni. Pp.xx, 344, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1982, $27.50, $18.95 ; London, SCM Press, 1982, £12.50. A Commentary on the Gospel of Mark. By Terence J. Keegan. Pp.183, New York, Paulist Press, and Leominster, Fowler Wright Books, 1981, £4.45. The (...) Panorama of Luke: An Introduction to the Gospel of Luke and the Acts of the Apostles. By Neil Richardson. Pp.116, London, Epworth Press, 1982, £3.95. The Synoptic Gospels: An Introduction. By Keith F. Nickle. Pp.119, London SCM Press, 1982, £5.50. What is a Gospel? By Nicholas King. Pp.132, Leigh‐on‐Sea, Kevin Mayhew, 1982, £3.00. The Women Around Jesus: Reflections on Authentic Personhood. By Elisabeth Moltmann‐Wendel, translated by J. Bowden. Pp.xii, 148, London, SCM Press, 1982, £3.95. Paul and Paulinism: Essays in honour of C.K. Barrett. Edited by M.D. Hooker and S.G. Wilson. Pp.xxvii, 404, London, SPCK, 1982, £25.00. Divine Revelation and the Limits of Historical Criticism. By William J. Abraham. Pp.222, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, £15.00. The Social Teaching of Vatican II. By Rodger Charles with Drostan Maclaren. Pp.xxvi, 569, San Francisco, Ignatius Press; Oxford, Plater Publications, 1982, £12.75. Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Vatican Social Teaching. By Donal Dorr. Pp.viii, 328, New York, Orbis Books; Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1983, £7.95. The Kindness that Kills. Edited by Digby Anderson. Pp.xii, 170, London SPCK, 1984, £3.95. Communism in the Bible. By José Porfiro Miranda. Pp.x, 86, London, SCM Press Ltd. 1982, £3.50. Why I am still a Catholic. Edited by Robert Nowell. Pp.157, London, Collins, 1982, £4.95. Does God Answer Prayer? By Peter Baelz. Pp.55, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1982, £1.95. A Cry for Mercy. By Henri J.M. Nouwen. Pp.175, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1982, £3.50. The Living Reminder. By Henri J.M. Nouwen. Pp.80, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1982, £2.95. Making All Things New. By Henri J.M. Nouwen. Pp.95, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1982. £2.95. Picturing God. By Norman Pittenger. Pp.x, 147, London, SCM Press, 1982, £4.50. Christotherapy II, The Fasting and Feasting Heart. By Bernard J. Tyrrell. Pp.xiii, 337, New York, Paulist Press, 1982, £6.70. With Respect: A Doctor's Response to a Healing Pope. By Frank Lake. Pp.xxiii, 327, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1982, £6.95. Euthanasia and Clinical Practice: Trends, Principles and Alternatives: The Report of a Working Party. Pp.viii, 88, London, The Linacre Centre, 1982, £2.75. Essays in Religion and Morality. By William James. Pp.xxviii, 345, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982, £17.50. Freud and Jung: Conflicts of Interpretation. By Robert Steele. Pp.vii, 390, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, £14.95. Archetype: A Natural History of the Self. By Anthony Stevens. Pp.xi, 324, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, £12.50. The Seeing Eye: Hermeneutical Phenomenology in the Study of Religion. By Walter L. Brenneman Jr. and Stanley O. Yarian, in association with Alan M. Olson. Pp.xii, 177, University Park and London, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982, £8.10. Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Edited by S.M. Cahn and D. Schatz. Pp.x, 310, Oxford University Press, 1982, £6.95. Beyond Empiricism: Philosophy of Science in Sociology. By Andrew Tudor. Pp.xii, 213, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, £4.95. Philosophy and Human Geography: An Introduction to Contemporary Approaches. By R.J. Johnston. Pp.viii, 152, London, Edward Arnold, 1982, £5.50. The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences. By Eric A. Havelock. pp.viii, 362, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982, £17.70, £6.30. The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste. By James McEvoy. Pp.xviii, 560, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, £35.00. Kant's Life and Thought. By Ernst Cassirer, translated by James Haden, introduction by Stephan Körner. Pp.xxiii, 429, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, £17.50. Kant's Theory of Form: An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason. By Robert B. Pippin. Pp.xii, 247, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1982, £16.50. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. By Martin Heidegger, translated by Albert Hofstadter. Pp.xxxi, 396, Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1982, £16.50. In the Active Voice By Mary Douglas. Pp.xi, 306, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, £9.75. Structural Sociology. Edited by Ino Rossi. Pp.xiv, 363, New York, Columbia University Presss, 1982, £45.50. A Vanquished Hope: The Movement for Church Renewal in Russia, 1905–1906. By J.W. Cunningham. Pp.384, Crestwood, St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1981, £7.95. Christians in Ulster 1968–1980. By Eric Gallagher and Stanley Worrall. P.241, Oxford University Press, 1982, £10.00. Scotland and the Papacy. By John Cooney. Pp.126, Edinburgh, Paul Harris, 1982, £8.95, £4.95. Scotia Pontificia. Edited by Robert Somerville. Pp.xiii, 177, Oxford, Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1982, £25.00. (shrink)

The timing of the Japanese Government's acceptance of the United Nations multilateral treaties governing several environmental concerns indicates Japan's priorities: biodiversity, global warming, and depletion of the ozone layer. Banning transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is the least prioritized, as indicated by Japan's failure to accept the Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention. The Japanese Environment Agency's policy statements and budget allocations between 1985 and 2000, as well as other official statements and programs, likewise indicate the same priorities. Moreover, of (...) the three priorities, global warming is the top. (shrink)

An account of predicate reference is presented which attempts to steer a middle course between reductionism, which construes the notion in terms of speakers' inclinations, and {transcendent) realism, which construes the notion in terms of properties. It is first introduced in the context of a discussion of the accounts of length (distance) advanced by Hans Reichenbach, Adolf Grünbaum and Hilary Putnam. A general account of predicate reference is then developed that explains the notion in terms of speakers' inclinations, while rejecting (...) the idea that this explanation should take the form of a reduction. The view is presented as a vindication of extreme nominalism, as it explains predicate reference solely in terms of the notion of qualia introduced by C.I. Lewis and developed by Nelson Goodman, which, it is argued, is definable in terms of speakers' classificatory propensities. Some connections are explored between the position that is presented and the views of Michael Dummett, John McDowell, Mark Johnston and Hilary Putnam, among others. (shrink)

El presente trabajo parte del paralelo antitético establecido en torno al par amigo-enemigo que aparece en el “Concepto de lo político” de C. Schmitt para, a continuación, analizar las interesantes propuestas que llevan a cabo distintos autores, entre otros, H. Blumenberg, a las que añadiremos como contrapunto los representantes de la Escuela de J. Ritter, W. Böckenförde y H. Lübbe. En especial señalamos el tránsito que se produce de la neutralidad a la neutralización, a partir de la nueva consideración de (...) la temporalidad que se produjo a comienzos del Siglo XVI. Sin embargo, de esta paradójica constitución surgirán una serie de mitos correlativos a la neutralización que la refuerzan, por lo que nos referimos, finalmente, al status quo y al regreso, que constituyen los ecos metáforicos del moderno binomio progreso-regreso. (shrink)

Aonio Paleario destacó por la defensa de posiciones filóginas que procurarían desmitificar las estructuras del patriarcado. Basado en el examen filológico de _Dell’economia o vero del governo della casa_ (1555), este artículo pone de manifiesto cómo Paleario consideraba a las mujeres del todo idóneas para la administración de bienes y recursos. Para el autor, ser hombre no se asocia necesariamente con dar una imagen de pulcritud y profesionalidad en la gestión del patrimonio familiar. Por ello, promoviendo acciones específicas en favor (...) de las mujeres, Paleario se sirve de su pensamiento discursivo para demostrar cómo la participación del colectivo femenino en la economía doméstica resulta clave para el desarrollo de la familia. (shrink)

Essays on Spanish-American philosophy, particularly Mexican. Part 2 includes selections from the works of José Vasconcelos, Antonio Caso, Samuel Ramos, Adolfo Menéndez Samara, Oswaldo Robes, Alfonso Reyes, Justino Fernández, Edmundo O'Gorman, J.D. García Bacca, Eduardo Nicol, José Medina Echevarría and Juan Larrea.

Este trabalho agencia a obra de Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari à educação em ciências ao jogar luzes sobre o deslocamento que permeia a organização deste componente curricular. O uso destes autores para pensarmos a educação em ciências, possibilita a (re)inserção da diferença e da multiplicidade, extirpadas do estrato científico pelo sonho moderno de totalização da realidade – que persiste no pedagógico – por meio da redução conceitual operada pela lógica da identidade. Assim, evidencia as (des)continuidades das práticas entre um (...) estrato e outro, como resultado da força de uma tradição que passa a ser subvertida pelo corte epistemológico deleuzo-guattariano. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz presented two different analyses of modal notions by means of many-valued logics: the linearly ordered systems Ł3,..., Open image in new window,..., \; the 4-valued logic Ł he defined in the last years of his career. Unfortunately, all these systems contain “Łukasiewicz type paradoxes”. On the other hand, Brady’s 4-valued logic BN4 is the basic 4-valued bilattice logic. The aim of this paper is to show that BN4 can be strengthened with modal operators following Łukasiewicz’s strategy for defining truth-functional (...) modal logics. The systems we define lack “Łukasiewicz type paradoxes”. Following Brady, we endow them with Belnap–Dunn type bivalent semantics. (shrink)

Showing che importance of art dialectic to science is attempted in this article, at the same time a confusion between them is avoided. To this aim fist, a bríef vision of the characters of science is offered. Then, the essentials characters of dialectic and its divers uses are examined. As a conclusion, it tries to bring to light how the dialectic technique, without giving scientific knowledge at all, is an essential scientific tool.